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PHYSICAL INJURY AND ECONOMIC LOSS - THE
FINE LINE OF DISTINCTION MADE CLEARER
CHRISTOPHER

C.

FALLON, JR. t

S

INCE THE ADVENT OF STRICT LIABILITY as introduced
in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts (Restatement) 1 and as initially adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,2 the battle has raged over what damages are to be
available to parties who claim that they have been injured in some
way as a result of their acquisition and use of defective products.
This battle has been provoked by the overlap of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 3 with strict liability tort principles, and has
become especially fierce when the damages are sustained in a commercial setting.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in its recent decision in Pennsylvania Glass Sand
Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,5 very clearly outlined the controversy as it has evolved and, to a great extent, succeeded in clarit Partner, Cozen, Begier and O'Connor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A.,
King's College, 1970; J.D., Syracuse University, 1972. Member, Pennsylvania
Bar.
The author wishes to thank Stuart Glenn Blackburn and Susan M. Danielski, associates in the firm of Cozen, Begier and O'Connor, for their assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
Pennsylvania adopted § 402A in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d
853 (1966). For examples of recent decisions applying § 402A, see Azarello v.
Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly
Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
2. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
3. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-9507 (Purdon Pamphlet 1980).
4. See notes 143-47 and accompanying text infra.
5. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'g, 496 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Pa. 1980).

(483)
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fying the fine line of distinction between damages recoverable in
tort and those recoverable in contract.
Damages sustained as a result of the acquisition or use of a
defective product can generally be categorized as follows: 1) personal injury; 2) physical injury to property other than the defective
product itself; 3) physical injury to the defective product itself;
4) damages arising as a result of the unsatisfactory performance of
the product or its failure to meet the expectations of the purchaser,
and 5) incidental and consequential damages.6

Recovery for per-

sonal injuries and for physical damage to property other than the
defective product itself is available in tort under strict liability
principles in jurisdictions which have adopted section 402A7 and
under negligence principles in jurisdictions which have not yet
embraced the doctrine of strict liability.8 The disagreement arises,
however, over the recoverability of damages of the third and fourth
categories, those sustained as a result of physical damage to the
product itself and those sustained as a result of the failure of the
product to meet the purchaser's expectations, each of which have
been labeled "economic loss." 1 It is this overlapping use of the
6. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 665-67 (4th ed. 1971); Keeton, The
Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles,
45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 583-88 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
See generally Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 1057, 1071-75 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1971);
Lipsius v. Bristol-Myers Co., 265 So. 2d 396 (Fla. App. 1972). See generally,
63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability §§ 25-123 (2d ed. 1972).
9. For examples of decisions disfavoring recovery of economic loss in tort,
see Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973);
Bright v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 463 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1972); Southwest
Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395
F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Iowa 1975), afj'd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976); Cooley v.
Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974); Noel Transfer &
Package Delivery Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F. Supp. 968 (D.
Minn. 1972); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976);
Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Hiigel v.
General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 47, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Alfred N. Koplin &
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); Hawkins
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 538 (1965); Price v.
Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
For examples of decisions permitting recovery of economic loss in tort,
see Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Cova v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian. Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
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term "economic loss" which has, in great part, contributed to the
confusion over which damages are recoverable in tort and which
are not.
Before one can intelligently commence an analysis of the types
of damages recoverable in tort and those recoverable in contract,
one must first define the term "economic loss." Fifteen years ago,
a commentator defined it as "the diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the
general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold." 10 In
1968, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, using the example of an exploding gas range, noted that the cost of "replacing
the stove has sometimes been referred to as 'economic loss.'"
Subsequently, another commentator defined economic loss as "the
financial injury sustained by the purchaser of a defective product,
where, neither personal injury, nor injury to property other than
the product occurs." 12
In Pennsylvania Glass Sand, the Third Circuit, relying heavily
on Justice Traynor's analysis in Seely v. White Motor Co., 13 dis-

tinguished economic loss from physical damage to a defective product itself when it noted:
The line that is drawn usually depends on the nature of
the defect and the manner in which the damage occurred.
Defects of quality, evidenced by internal deterioration or
breakdown, are assigned to the economic loss category,
while the loss stemming from defects that cause accidents
"of violence or collision with external objects" is treated
14
as physical injury.

The court went on, however, to outline the interrelated factors
which it believed must be analyzed when attempting to draw the
line between physical injury which is recoverable in tort and ecolanco v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975);
Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976); City of
La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d

124 (1976).
10. Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966).
11. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 231 n.7, 246 A.2d 848, 855 n.7
(1968), citing Comment, supra note 10. See note 83 and accompanying text

infra.

12. Mislow, The Recovery of Economic Losses Under Strict Liability: A

Lesson in Applied Metaphysics, 11

PA.

RESEARCHER

1, 1 (Oct. 1980).

13. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
14. 652 F.2d at 1169-70 (footnote omitted). See also Comment, Economic
Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966)
(direct economic loss differentiated from consequential economic loss).
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nomic loss which, under the majority view as defined by the Third
Circuit, is not compensable under negligence or strict liability
standards. 15 These factors include: "the nature of the defect, the
type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose." 16 These
factors, the court noted, bear directly on whether the "safety insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-bargain protection policy
of warranty law is most applicable to a particular claim." 17
The battle over the recoverability in tort of damages sustained
to a defective product itself, whether called physical damage or
economic loss, was fueled by a split of authorty which arose early
in the development of strict liability.' 8 In 1965, the supreme
courts of California and of New Jersey were both called upon to determine whether damages for physical injury to a defective product
itself could be recovered in strict liability actions. The California
Supreme Court articulated what has become the majority view in its
decision in Seely, 19 while the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated
what has since become the minority view in Santor v. A & M
20
Karagheusian,Inc.

The plaintiff in Seely had purchased a truck manufactured by
the defendant. 2 1 From October, 1959, when he purchased the
truck, until late 1960, the plaintiff had experienced numerous difficulties with the truck's operation..2 2 On one occasion, the truck
was damaged when it overturned after its brakes failed. 23 The
plaintiff had the truck repaired at a cost of over $5000, and he
suffered lost profits of over $9000 while the truck was being repaired.2 4 Despite efforts by the distributor and the manufacturer
to correct the difficulties, the truck's deficiencies continued. 25 In
15. 652 F.2d at 1169-73.
16. Id. at 1173.
17. Id.

18. See Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases,
L. Rrv. 493 (1978); Comment, Products Liability: Expanding the
Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 963 (1978); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss
in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L.
29

MERCER

REV. 145 (1972).

19. For a discussion of Seely, see notes 21-35 & 51 and accompanying text
infra. See also note 9 supra and authorities cited therein.
20. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). For a discussion of Santor, see notes
36-44 and accompanying text infra. See also note 9 supra and authorities
cited therein.
21. 63 Cal. 2d at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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September 1960, the truck was repossessed after the plaintiff refused
26
to continue making payments toward its purchase price.
The plaintiff brought an action against the distributor and

the manufacturer to recover his payments toward the purchase price,
his repairs to the truck, and his lost profits. 27 The trial court
found that the manufacturer had breached its warranty to the
plaintiff, and it awarded damages for his payments and his lost
profits. 28

His repair costs were disallowed, however, because the

trial court found that he had failed to prove that the truck's defects
were the cause of the brake failure which necessitated the repairs.2 9
On appeal, the California Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether strict liability tort principles or the warranty
provisions of the UCC should be applied in determining the damages which the plaintiff could recover. In an opinion by Justice
Traynor, the court pointed out that strict liability had not totally
superseded the provisions of the UCC, stating: "The history of . . .
strict liability . . . indicates that it was designed . . . to govern the

distinct problem of physical injuries," 30 and the court found that
the warranty provisions of the UCC were appropriate in the commercial setting.3 1 Therefore, the court reasoned, the plaintiff
could not be compensated for the loss of the benefit of his bargain
-the purchase price and his lost profits-under the rules of strict
32

liability.

While the court held that the plaintiff could not recover under
strict liability for his "economic losses" caused by the product's
failure to perform satisfactorily, the court noted in dictum that his
reliance on a tort theory of recovery would not prevent the plaintiff
from recovering his repair costs if he could establish that the damage to the product was caused by the conduct of the defendant.33
The court reasoned that physical injury to property "is so akin to
personal injury" that there is no reason to distinguish between
the two.' 4 While disallowing recovery of the damages which it
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.

31. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
34. Id., citing Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960). See also Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1966) (plaintiff permitted to recover in strict liability for physical
damage to defective product itself).
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characterized as economic losses, the California Supreme Court
was of the opinion that physical injury to persons or property, including the defective product itself, was compensable under the
strict liability theory."
An alternative view on the question of whether economic loss
is recoverable in tort was expressed by the New Jersey- Supreme
Court in Santor.36 In Santor, the plaintiff had purchased a carpet
38
manufactured by the defendant.3 7 The carpet developed lines.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the carpeting was defective and that the manufacturer had breached its warranty of merchantability3 9 The trial court found that the manufacturer had
breached its warranty, and it awarded the plaintiff damages for
40
the full amount of the carpet's purchase price.
While the New Jersey Supreme Court found the breach of warranty action a permissible theory of recovery, it reasoned that strict
liability in tort would "cast [the manufacturer's liability] in simpler
form," 41 and it permitted the plaintiff to recover his damages under

a strict liability theory. 42 The supreme court modified the trial
court's award of the full purchase price to "the difference between
the price paid by plaintiff and the actual market value of the defective carpeting at the time when the plaintiff knew or should have
known that it was defective." 43 Thus, the plaintiff was permitted
to recover his economic loss-the benefit of his bargain-under
44
principles of strict liability.

In addition to the Seely and Santor approaches, there are a
number of other views which highlight the very problem with which
35. 63 Cal. 2d at 16-18, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-24. Seely
was followed in Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Droitt Mfg. Co., 66 App. Div. 2d 368,
412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979). In Dudley, a crane owned by the plaintiff and man-

ufactured by the defendant had collapsed and was damaged. Id. at 370, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 513. The Dudley court followed the California Supreme Court's
dictum in Seeley, and held that physical injuries caused by defects that create
an unreasonable risk of harm are compensable in strict liability. Id. at 374,
412 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
36. See 44 N.J. at 52, 207 A.2d at 305.
37. Id. at 55, 207 A.2d at 306.
38. Id. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307.
39. Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 307.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 311.
42. Id. at 63-68, 207 A.2d at 311-13.
43. Id. at 68-69, 207 A.2d at 314.
44. See id. To the Santor court, compensation for physical damage to a
defective product itself could also be recovered since, as the court stated, the
"responsibility of the maker should be no different where (there is] damage to
the article sold or to other property of the consumer." Id. at 66, 207 A.2d
at 312.
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489

the Third Circuit was confronted after the lower court had held in
Pennsylvania Glass Sand that losses sustained as a result of repair
or replacement of a defective product itself constitute economic
losses which are not recoverable in tort. In Georgia, for example,
strict liability protection extends only to natural persons, and the
tort redress available to corporate plaintiffs for physical damage
45
to a defective product itself is limited to traditional negligence.
Virginia has failed to adopt strict liability in tort to protect any
consumer, and thus corporations, like natural persons, must seek
recompense in tort for their property damages by establishing the
negligence of the manufacturer or seller of a defective product. 48

Courts in Texas and Illinois, perhaps misapplying the reasoning of
Justice Traynor in Seely, 47 have included damage to a defective

product itself within the economic loss rubric and have denied recovery in tort for physical damages sustained by corporations. 48
Dean Keeton's position is that recovery in tort for damage to a
defective product itself should not be allowed. 49

He wrote:

A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous condition" that causes damage only to the product

itself and the type that is dangerous to other property or
persons. A hazardous product that has harmed something
or someone can be labeled a part of the accident problem;
tort law seeks to protect against this type of harm through
allocation of risk. In contrast, a damaging event that
harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to
policy considerations directing liability placement in tort.
Consequently, if a defect causes damage limited solely to
the property, recovery should be available if at all on a
contract-warranty theory. 0
Such reasoning, however, does little to advance the purposes
behind strict liability. A product is no less defective if it injures
only itself, and, accordingly, its manufacturer is no less culpable
under such circumstances. As Justice Traynor stated in Seely:
45. Long Mfg., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 231 S.E.2d
105 (1976).
46. See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
47. For a discussion of Justice Traynor's analysis in Seely, see notes 21-35
& 51 and accompanying text infra.
48. See Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194,
364 N.E.2d 100 (1977), Mid-Continent Aircraft v. Curry County Spraying
Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
49. See Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law on Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1

(1978).
50. Id. at 5.
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The distinction that the law has drawn between tort
recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the
"luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing
physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer
must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by
defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety
defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable
risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless
he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at
the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of
physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He
can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the
product will not match his economic expectations unless
the manufacturer agrees that it will. 51
This distinction set forth by Justice Traynor appears to have
been overlooked by the courts which, following the reasoning of
Dean Keeton, have automatically treated damage to a defective
52
product itself as economic loss.
Against this background, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
was called upon to enter the fray in Pennsylvania Glass Sand.53 In
November 1971, Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation (Pennsylvania Glass Sand), the operator of a sand quarry and processing
plant in central Pennsylvania, purchased a front-end loader from
the Caterpillar Tractor Company (Caterpillar).54 After nearly
four years of continuous use, a fire originated in the forward portion of the front-end loader near hydraulic lines connected to the
loader's bucket.55 While the operator was able to escape without
injury, in his haste to evacuate the equipment he failed to turn
off the motor. 6 The hydraulic fluid in the lines thus remained
pressurized and fueled the fire. 57 The front-end loader was not
51. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.

52. For a discussion of Dean Keeton's reasoning, see notes 49-50 and
accompanying text supra.
53. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
54. 652 F.2d at 1166.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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equipped with any type of fire suppression system, and was severely
damaged by the fire.," The plaintiff spent over $170,000 to repair
the damaged equipment and to secure replacement equipment
while the damaged loader was being repaired.9
Since the statute of limitations applicable to an action on the
loader's warranty had expired, 60 Pennsylvania Glass Sand brought
suit on theories of strict liability and negligence. 61 The plaintiff
alleged that the loader was defective due to the absence of fire
suppression equipment and the absence of any warnings or instruc62
tions to the operator of what to do in the event of a fire.

Caterpillar, the defendant manufacturer, filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's damages constituted
economic losses for which Pennsylvania law did not permit recovery
in a tort action.63 On hearing the defendant's motion, the trial
court framed the issue to be decided on summary judgment as
"whether Pennsylvania law .

.

. permits recovery for .

.

. economic

losses in an action sounding in tort or whether [the] remedies are
limited to those available under the UCC for breach of warranty
and subject to whatever limitation of remedies for breach of warranty the parties may have agreed upon." 64
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1166-67.
60. See 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2725(a) (Purdon Pamphlet 1980) (four
year UCC statute of limitations).
61. 652 F.2d at 1166.
62. Id. at 1166-67.
63. Id. at 1167. In its motion, the defendant relied on the recent decision of the Third Circuit in Jones &cLaughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
In Jones & Laughlin, the court had been called upon to determine
whether the repair and replacement costs of an allegedly defective roof were
compensable under § 402A. See 626 F.2d at 284. The manufacturer had warranted that the roof would withstand high winds and wet weather conditions;
over a period of time, however, portions of the roof had blown away or
suffered damage from inclement weather. Id. at 282. Applying Illinois law,
the Third Circuit pointed out that the damage to the roof was exactly the
type against which the manufacturer had warranted its product. See id. at 293.
It bears emphasis that the damage to the roof in Jones & Laughlin did
not arise as the result of an "accident" of a type traditionally compensable in
tort, and the product itself was not unsafe or hazardous. See id. at 282.
Classifying the damage to the roof as an economic loss, the Jones & Laughlin
court refused to permit recovery under § 402A. See id. at 293.
While the facts of Jones & Laughlin and of Pennsylvania Glass Sand are
somewhat similar, in Jones & Laughlin the Third Circuit did not need to
determine whether the damage to the roof constituted physical damage or
economic loss since the court's decision was based solely on the issue of
whether Illinois law permitted recovery for economic loss in strict liability.
See id. at 285.
64. 496 F. Supp. at 713.
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Finding no Pennsylvania authority directly on point, 65 the
district court reviewed the decisions discussing the distinction between warranty actions and strict liability actions.6 6 Defining economic losses as those which result when a product fails to perform
as expected, the district court predicted that the Pennsylvania courts
would find strict liability in tort to be an inappropriate remedy
for such losses in actions between a corporate purchaser and a manufacturer.67 The court found this rule to hold true "regardless
of the nature of the defect in the product." 38 Emphasizing the
equal bargaining positions of the parties, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar.6 9
The Third Circuit reversed, and in so doing it narrowed the
issue upon which the decision was based. As the Third Circuit
viewed the case, the question before it was whether "accidental
injury to the defective product itself should be regarded as an
economic loss."

70

Recognized by the court as essential in its analysis of the issue
at hand was the portion of the Seely 71 opinion in which Justice
Traynor specifically acknowledged the availability of strict tort
liability remedies to redress physical injury to a defective product
itself.7 2 Justice Traynor's view, now that of the Third Circuit, is
in accord with Dean Prosser's distinction between the two types of
injury-physical harm and economic loss. As Dean Prosser stated:
There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any kind of physical harm, including not
only personal injuries, but also property damage to the deBut where there is no accident,
fective chattel itself. . .
and no physical damage, and the only loss is a pecuniary
one, through loss of the value or use of the thing sold or
the cost of repairing it, courts have adhered to the rule...
that purely economic interests are not entitled to protection
against mere negligence. .... 73
65. See note 63 supra.
66. 496 F. Supp. at 713-15.
67. Id. at 715.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 715-16.
70. 652 F.2d at 1167.
71. For a discussion of Seely, see notes 21-35 & 51 and accompanying text

supra.
72. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
73. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 665 (footnotes omitted).
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The pronouncements of Justice Traynor 7 4 the Third Circuit,76
and Dean Prosser 76 make it clear that there must be a distinction
between qualitative defects and defects which cause physical harm.
This is in recognition of the fact that warranty law, which provides
the purchaser only with the benefit of his bargain as redress for inferior quality, is ill-suited to provide protection for accidents or
catastrophic incidents such as the destruction of Pennsylvania
Glass Sand's front-end loader.
In making the distinction between economic loss and physical
harm, the Third Circuit also relied heavily on the Alaska Supreme
Court's decision in Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co.17 In Cloud,
the plaintiff's mobile home had been severely damaged as the result
of the ignition of the unit's polyurethane carpet padding.7 s The.
Alaska court opined that public policy requires a manufacturer to
bear the loss when its product proves to be dangerous or hazardous.7 '
Citing Cloud, the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania Glass Sand carried
this view to the conclusion that recovery in tort "should not depend on the fortuity of whether . . . a person escapes injury."

80

The court in Pennsylvania Glass Sand next turned to an examination of Pennsylvania jurisprudence in order to make its "prediction" of how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule on
the issue presented."'
In Kassab v. Central Soya, 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had noted, in dictum, the possible availability of recovery of dam74. See notes 21-35 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 53-72 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
77. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
78. Id. at 249.
79. Id. at 250. The Alaska court emphasized the powerlessness of consumers to protect themselves against such accidents. See id.
The Alaska Supreme Court further defined the scope of its decision in
Cloud in Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d
324 (Alaska 1981). In Northern Power, the plaintiff claimed damages in strict
liability for damage to an engine caused by a failure in the machine's low oil
pressure shut-down system. Id. at 325-27. The Alaska court stated that "when
a defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or
other property, and loss occurs as a result of that danger, strict liability in tort
is an appropriate theory of recovery, even though the damage is confined to
the product itself." Id. at 329 (footnote omitted).
80. 652 F.2d at 1172. See note 79 supra.
81. See 652 F.2d at 1173. Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it has been well-settled
that federal courts are bound to follow state law. Moreover, when the applicable state law is unclear, federal courts are obligated to "predict" how
the state courts would resolve the issue in controversy. See McKenna v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980).
82. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
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ages to a defective product itself in a strict liability action.

The

Kassab court stated:
The language of the Restatement, speaking as it does of
injury to either the individual or his property, appears
broad enough to cover practically all of the harm that could
befall one due to a defective product. Thus, for example,

were one to buy a defective gas range which exploded,
ruining the buyer's kitchen, injuring him, and of course
necessitating a replacement of the stove itself, all of these
three elements of the injury should be compensable. The
last, replacing the stove, has been sometimes referred to as
"economic loss," i.e., "the diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work
for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and
sold." There would seem to be no reason for excluding
this measure of damages in an action brought under the
Restatement, since the defective product itself is as much

''property" as any other possession of the plaintiff that is

83
damaged as a result of the manufacturing flaw.

The Third Circuit relied on this footnote in Kassab to predict
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize the distinction between economic loss and physical injury.84 In so doing,
the Third Circuit pointed to two Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions which permitted plaintiffs to recover for property damage
In Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford
to a defective product itself.8
Motor Co.,)" a truck purchased by the plaintiff and manufactured
by the defendant had caught fire several days after it was first put
to use.8 7 The Pennsylvania Superior Court permitted the plaintiff,
83. Id. at 231 n.7, 246 A.2d at 854 n.7 (citation omitted). Relying on
this passage from Kassab, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has determined
that Pennsylvania law would permit recovery in strict liability for damage to
a defective product. See Air Prods. 8 Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.,
58 Wis. 2d 193, 217-18, 206 N.W.2d 414, 426-27 (1973).
84. See 652 F.2d at 1173-75. Accord Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973). See note 83 and
accompanying text supra.
85. 652 F.2d at 1173. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra. A

handful of decisions from the federal courts have permitted recovery of damages to a defective product itself under Pennsylvania law, but without discussing the economic loss issue. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J.
Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Drott Mfg.
Co., 433 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp.,
370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem.

Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
86. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 129, 359 A.2d 822 (1976).
87. Id. at 132, 359 A.2d at 823.
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a corporation, to recover for the damage to the truck under section
402A.ss Similarly, in MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co.,8 9 the plaintiff was permitted to recover for damage to her vehicle from an ac-

cident occurring after its steering mechanism failed.""
The Third Circuit also examined several recent federal cases
holding, under Pennsylvania law, that warranty disclaimers limiting
negligence or strict liability claims must be set out with particularityY1 In examining these recent federal cases, the court again
reiterated the dichotomy between the loss of the benefit of one's

bargain and the loss of a product or the use of a product by a
danger which creates a serious risk of harm to persons or property2
The Third Circuit carefully distinguished its decision in Posttape
Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 98 wherein it had permitted a
manufacturer to disclaim warranty liability for damage to a defective product itself.'4 The Pennsylvania Glass Sand court pointed
out that although a defect in a roll of film purchased by the plaintiff in Posttape rendered the product useless, it did not create an
unsafe or hazardous conditionf 6 The plaintiff in Posttape was
only denied the benefit of its bargain; it was not subjected to a
hazardous or dangerous condition.
Following its clear delineation of the issue presented in Pennsylvania Glass Sand,9 6 the Third Circuit predicted that the loss of
the plaintiff's front-end loader and associated damages were of the
kind which would clearly be recoverable in tort under Pennsylvania
law:
88. Id. at 141-42, 359 A.2d at 827-28. The superior court did not discuss
the question of economic loss. See note 85 supra.
89. 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
90. Id. at 391, 257 A.2d at 680. The court did not address the question
of economic loss. See notes 85 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
91. See 652 F.2d 1175-76. See, e.g., Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974); Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power
8c Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1978). While these decisions are most
frequently cited as authority for the proposition that a disclaimer of warranty
in a contract of sale will not permit a manufacturer to escape liability under
strict liability or negligence unless the disclaimer is set forth clearly and with
particularity, it would appear that the most significant impact of these cases
is the courts' willingness to uphold such clauses when they satisfy the standard
of clarity and particularity. For a further discussion of the impact of contractual disclaimers, see notes 142-50 and accompanying text infra.

92. See 652 F.2d at 1174.
93. 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 755-57. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.

95. 652 F.2d at 1174.
96. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
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We therefore believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would draw a distinction between the type of injury to a
defective product that constitutes mere economic loss,
and the type of injury that amounts to the sort of physical
harm traditionally compensable in tort.
....
We predict that the state's courts would adhere
to the majority view that claims for damage caused by
hazardous conditions may be brought under tort law,
regardless of whether the plaintiff is an ordinary consumer
7
or a commercial consumerY
Pennsylvania Glass Sand did not lose the benefit of its bargain;
indeed, its front-end loader had performed without incident for
nearly four years prior to the fire in question8

Pennsylvania

Glass Sand had, however, sustained damages as a result of an accident caused by a defect in the product.9 9 Therefore, recovery for
damage to the defective product itself was held to be compensable
in tort under strict liability. 0 0
By its decision in Pennsylvania Glass Sand, the Third Circuit
took a major step in advancing Justice Traynor's articulation in
Seely of the parameters of recovery in strict liability. 101 Although
tort and contract doctrines do indeed overlap in products liability, 0 2 certain instances exist in which it is important to set forth
the distinction between the two concepts clearly. Pennsylvania
Glass Sand presented the classic setting in which to articulate
such a distinction. Although Pennsylvania Glass Sand's losses were
clearly recoverable under the UCC, two obstacles stood in the way
of such recovery. The first was the statute of limitations for UCC
10 3
actions, which had expired, leaving only tort remedies to pursue.
The second was the limited warranty given by Caterpillar to Penn97. 652 F.2d at 1173-75.
98. See id. at 1166.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 1175-76. Since its decision was reached on an appeal from
summary judgment, the Third Circuit remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether the alleged defects in the front-end loader caused
the damage. Id. at 1176.

101. For a discussion of Justice Traynor's analysis in Seely, see notes
21-35 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit
acknowledged this overlap. See 652 F.2d at 1165-66.
103. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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sylvania Glass Sand, which, as Caterpillar argued, preempted any
10 4
warranty action beyond its terms.
The situation presented in Pennsylvania Glass Sand is not an
uncommon one in the products liability area, especially in cases
in which corporate plaintiffs are involved. The pivotal question
in such cases is, of course, whether and when a manufacturer
should be allowed to escape tort liability for damage caused by a
defective product. One of the major purposes of strict liability
in tort has been to alleviate the harsh results which often befall
the consumer seeking recompense in warranty actions. 10 5 The
Third Circuit recognized that the distinction between recovery
in tort and recovery in contract does not depend on the type of
damages claimed, but rather on the nature of the defect and the
manner in which the damage occurred. 10 6 Although damage to a
defective product itself often may be redressable only in contract,
the distinction does not turn on so simple a test. When a product
is hazardous, as opposed to merely unsuitable, tort law will impose
liability on the manufacturer if the ultimate impact of the hazard
is on people, property, or the product itself.
By focusing on the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and
the manner in which the injury arose, the Third Circuit set forth
a test by which future cases can be analyzed. 0 7 While it is now
clear under Pennsylvania law that a hazardous defect in a product
which causes physical property damage, even to the product itself,
is firmly within the ambit of tort principles, 08 the Pennsylvania
Glass Sand test is not absolute. Its vagueness is attributable to
the difficult task that the Third Circuit sought to accomplish, that is,
to articulate the fine line of distinction between contract and tort.
Indeed, although Pennsylvania Glass Sand resolved a very important
question, the decision leaves unresolved a substantial grey area
encompassing the numerous factual settings which did not exist in
Pennsylvania Glass Sand and which will have to be addressed by
other Pennsylvania state and federal courts in the future.
The questions left unresolved by Pennsylvania Glass Sand are
numerous, and each will require resolution by an appellate court
before the fine line of distinction between tort law and contract
104. See 652 F.2d at 1175. The court left open the question of whether
Caterpillar's limited warranty precluded recovery in negligence or strict liability. See id. at 1176.
105. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 494-96.
106. See 652 F.2d at 1174-75.
107. See id. at 1174.
108. See notes 82-90 S&97-101 and accompanying text supra.
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law in commercial product liability controversies is ultimately

established. The first and most obvious was recognized by the
Third Circuit itself when it noted: "With some products, an
'accident' may not be clearly distinguishable from internal deterioration." 109 Within months of the Third Circuit's decision, a state
trial court in Pennsylvania was called upon to resolve this very
issue.
In Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester

Co.," 0 the court was called upon to determine whether the purchaser of nineteen trucks, the majority of which developed cracks
and failures in their frames, could recover in tort from the manufacturer for the expense of making repairs and replacements.",
Confronted with the question of whether the damage to the trucks
constituted compensable "physical harm," the court, citing Pennsylvania Glass Sand, declared: "A 402A claim for physical harm
is maintainable where the plaintiff suffers 'losses stemming from
defects that cause accidents of violence or collision with external
objects.' " 112 The court, however, characterized the cracked frames
as "defects of quality, evidenced by internal deterioration or breakdown" which constitute economic loss, and thus held that the
plaintiff's damages were not recoverable under strict liability
principles. 118
Where, then, should the line be drawn? Should recovery depend on the nature of the physical damage sustained? Should
it depend on whether an accident has actually occurred, whether
the accident is large or small, or whether there has been a series of
small accidents? Or should it depend on whether the safety hazard
created by a defective product is substantial or minimal?
While it is clear that damages sustained as a result of a defect
that does not render a product dangerous, such as the allegedly
defective carpeting involved in Santor,114 the allegedly defective
film involved in Posttape,"8 or the allegedly defective electrobase
109. 652 F.2d at 1171 n.19 (citations omitted).
110. 61 Phila. 141 (C.P. Phila. 1981).
111. See id. at 144-45.
112. Id. at 149 (citation omitted).

113. Id.
114. For a discussion of Santor, see notes 36-44 and accompanying text
supra.

115. For a discussion of Posttape, see notes 93-95 and accompanying text
supra.
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stock paper involved in Plainville Paper Co., Inc. v. Pram, Inc.," 6
constitute "economic losses" which the Third Circuit has held
are not compensable in tort under Pennsylvania law, does a cracked
frame, a key structural element of a motor vehicle which could
obviously cause further damage to the vehicle itself as well as to
persons or property, constitute physical damage for which the tort
remedy should lie? Is the cracking of the frame of a truck properly
classified as "deterioration" or is it an accident, albeit a small one,
in which physical damage is sustained? Was it necessary that one
of the Industrial Uniform trucks first be involved in a collision
as a result of a cracked frame before the tort remedy would be
available, or is it enough that a crack in a truck frame creates a
safety hazard? While Pennsylvania Glass Sand does not specifically
answer these questions, its reliance on Justice Traynor's analysis
in Seely, of the types of risks which are to be protected by contract
law as well as the policy questions to be addressed in determining
who should bear the risk of loss, warrants repetition and may
indeed be instructive to courts called upon in the future to resolve
these issues: "The distinction that the law has drawn between
tort recovery and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having
an accident causing physical injury." '
Other questions left unresolved in Pennsylvania Glass Sand
are whether there must actually be a sudden and calamitous injury
before one can recover in tort, and what will be deemed to constitute physical harm.
As noted above, the Alaska Supreme Court in Cloud permitted the owner of a mobile home that was badly damaged by
the ignition of highly flammable polyurethane foam rug padding
to maintain a strict liability action against the manufacturer of the
mobile home on the grounds that the extremely inflammable nature
of the carpet padding constituted a defect." 8 Having upheld a
determination that a consumer whose house trailer is destroyed
by its defective carpet padding may sue the manufacturer in tort,
will a court, following the approach of Seely and Pennsylvania
Glass Sand, permit a manufacturer to sue the supplier of the defec116. 430 F. Supp. 1386 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The product involved in Plainville Paper, photocopying paper, was rendered unusable by a high penetration
of solvents which exceeded the parties' contract specifications. Id. at 1387.
117. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. For a discussion of Seely, see notes 21-35 8: 51 and accompanying text supra.
118. For a discussion of Cloud, see notes 77-80 and accompanying text
supra. See also note 79 supra.
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tive padding, in tort, for the cost of replacing the padding in its
unsold trailers before they were involved in fires or before other
property damage or serious personal injuries or deaths were
sustained?
This issue was addressed by Judge Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in his unpublished opinion in the Celotex
Corp. "Technifoam" Products Liability Litigation 119 involving the
product "Technifoam." 120 Some of the plaintiffs in the litigation
sought damages for the costs which would be incurred in replacing
Technifoam insulation installed in their buildings.' 21 They alleged in their complaints that the buildings in which Technifoam
had been installed had been rendered hazardous, unsuitable for
their intended use, dangerous in use and habitation, and that as a
result thereof they had suffered serious depreciation in the value
of their buildings.1 22 The defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the installation of Technifoam, although admittedly inflammable, constituted mere economic loss
without causing any compensable physical harm to the plaintiffs'
123
property.
Rejecting the defendant's arguments, Judge Weiner declared:
Here it cannot be gainsaid that the installation and integration of highly flammable insulating material into farm
buildings does not cause a reduction in their market value
and pose substantial, unanticipated risks. The fact of
property damage here is clear. We cannot agree with defendant that plaintiffs' claims under strict liability and
negligence are judicially cognizable only when a fire
occurs.

1 24

While Judge Weiner's decision was based on the law of Miniiesota and of Wisconsin,' 25 it is noteworthy that he too predicated
26
his decision in large part on Justice Traynor's approach in Seely.'
119. No. 76-210 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1976).
120. Id., slip op. at 3. "Technifoam" was described by Judge Weiner as a
highly inflammable cellular plastic polyurethane board product used as interior
insulation. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
121. Id., slip. op. at 4.
122. Id.
123. Id., slip op.
124. Id., slip op.
125. See id., slip
126. See id., slip
51 and accompanying

at 3.
at 7 (emphasis added).
op. at 1.
op. at 4-7. For a discussion of Seely, see notes 21-35
text supra.
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If Judge Weiner's conclusion that property damage is sustained by virtue of the sale of a defective product which poses a
substantial risk of danger is correct, 12 7 then it would appear that,
regardless of whether there is sudden and calamitous damage, one
who must repair or replace defective products which are dangerous
or potentially dangerous to users may secure recompense in tort.
Such a result would appear to have the strong support of the Third
Circuit which, in Pennsylvania Glass Sand, declared:
When the defect is of a type that creates a safety hazard...
"physical injury is so akin to personal injury that there is
no reason for distinguishing them."
• . . [T]ort law imposes a duty on manufacturers to
produce safe items, regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the hazard is on people, other property, or the
28
product itself.
Although an analysis of Pennsylvania Glass Sand demonstrates
that the decision leaves a number of questions unresolved, it is
clear that, under Pennsylvania law, purchasers of defective products
which are dangerous and cause physical harm will be accorded redress in tort for the injuries that they sustain. 2 9 Whether the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will expand the presently uncharted
boundaries of tort law to the extent accomplished by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Santor 130 or whether it will choose to embrace
the Seely distinction 13 remains to be seen.
In November 1981, the Pennsylvania Superior Court handed
down its decision in Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 32 a
case in which the parameters of what actually constitutes physical
harm were discussed in detail by a sharply divided court.
In Lobianco, the plaintiff, who had purchased a burglar alarm
system from the defendant, sought to recover under principles of
strict liability when the system failed to work and the plaintiff
suffered a loss of jewelry by theft. 33 The trial court had held that
127.
128.
129.
130.
supra.

See
652
See
For

note 124 and accompanying text supra.
F.2d at 1170-73.
notes 82-90 & 97-101 and accompanying text supra.
a discussion of Santor, see notes 36-44 and accompanying text

131. For a discussion of Seely, see notes 21-35 &51 and accompanying text
supra.
132. - Pa. Super. Ct. _, 437 A.2d 417 (1981).
133. Id. at _, 437 A.2d at 418.
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the only products which fall under strict liability are those which
are dangerous and actually cause physical harm. 13 4 However, Judge

Spaeth, announcing the decision of the superior court, declared:
[T]he expression "physical harm" as used in Section 402A
should not be construed as requiring that the plaintiff
-"the user or consumer"-prove damage to the property.
...

The reason Section 402A was adopted was not to

protect property from damage but to protect the user or
consumer of the property from the loss. Whether the loss
is caused by damage to the property or by its disappearance
is immaterial.
A product may by itself be entirely innocuous-harmless-and yet, because in conjunction with some other thing
or event it caused physical harm, strict liability may be
imposed.
...

The intended use and purpose of a burglar alarm

system is to sound an alarm if a burglar enters the house.
If because of defective batteries, the system does not sound
an alarm, with the result that a burglar is able to enter the
house undetected and do physical harm to jewelry inside,
the issue of the manufacturer's strict liability may not be
resolved by saying, as did the lower court, that although
defective, the system was not "dangerous" to the jewelry
it was supposed to protect.'3
While it is clear that Judge Spaeth's opinion in Lobianco
broadly defined the parameters of what constitutes physical harm,
the Lobianco court held that the plaintiff could not prevail in her
action against the supplier of her security system under strict liability principles. 36 In reaching its decision, the court's rationale
134. See id. at , 437 A.2d at 418-19.
135. Id. at _, 437 A.2d at 422-24.
136. Id. at -, 437 A.2d at 425. The difficulty in evaluating the impact
of the Lobianco decision is the split among the judges of the superior court.
Judge Spaeth announced the decision of the court. See id. at -, 437 A.2d at
418-26. President judge Cercone wrote a concurring statement. See id. at

437 A.2d at 426 (Cercone, P.J., concurring). Judge Brosky filed a concurrence, in which Judge Cavanaugh joined. See id. at -, 437 A.2d at 426-27
(Brosky, J., concurring), Judge Montgomery, joined by Judge Hester, dissented. See id. at - 437 A.2d at 427-31 (Montgomery, J., dissenting). Finally,
the reported decision does not indicate that Judge Price, the seventh judge on
the Lobianco court, joined in any of the five opinions.
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was not that there was no physical harm or property damage, but
rather that "as between the homeowner and the manufacturer, the
manufacturer is more 'defenseless' than the homeowner" since the
consumer can secure homeowner's insurance. 37 While it is unclear
whether the plaintiff in Lobianco was indeed insured or whether
the action in question was a subrogation action, it is crystal clear
that some members of the superior court believed that the plaintiff
was insured, and that she was thus in a better position to bear the
38
risk of loss than was the manufacturer.1
In a concurring opinion, Judge Brosky, joined by Judge Cavanaugh, declared: "I do not believe that the insurability of appellants' loss provides a basis for the denial of strict liability recovery.
Rather I would find that the injury suffered by appellant is not of
the type for which strict liability ought to be imposed." 139 Judge
Brosky opined that the relief sought by the plaintiff was compensa1 40
tion for the loss of her bargain rather than her property loss.
As Judge Brosky stated, while "the appellant's economic situation
is worsened ... there is no evidence that the property was harmed.
• . . [A]ny 'harm' to the property was not the result of an unsafe
condition of the alarm, but, rather, . . . its malfunctioning." 141
Although it is clear that sellers of defective products will be
held liable after Pennsylvania Glass Sand for physical damage caused
to dangerously defective products, sellers of products in a commercial setting are not without the opportunity to insulate themselves
contractually from liability for damages from pure economic loss
or other types of physical property damage. In Neville Chemical
Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.,142 the Third Circuit, reviewing Pennsylvania law, held that a seller may limit its exposure to liability
if "the provisions and terms of the contract clearly and unequivocally spell out the intent to grant such immunity and relief from
liability." 143 Subsequently, in Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J.
Since Judge Brosky's concurring opinion withheld his support from Judge
Spaeth's § 402A analysis, it therefore appears that Judge Spaeth's view represents the consensus of at most three members of the Lobianco court. See id.
at _, 437 A.2d at 426 (Brosky, J., concurring). As such, Judge Spaeth's opinion
is not binding as precedent. See Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp.
1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975), a0f'd without opinion, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir.
1976), citing Commonwealth v. Silverman, 422 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971).

137. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 437 A.2d at 425.
138. See id. at -, 437 A.2d at 426 (Brosky, J., concurring).
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at _, 437 A.2d at 426 (Brosky, J., concurring).
See id. at _, 437 A.2d at 427 (Brosky, J., concurring).
Id. at - 437 A.2d at 427 (Brosky, J., concurring).
422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).

143. Id. at 1217.
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Enstrom Corp., 44 the Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania
law would recognize a freely negotiated and clearly expressed waiver
of liability between business entities of relatively equal bargaining
strength. 145 Thereafter, in Posttape, the Third Circuit indicated
that an agreement which restricts the types of damages which may
be recovered as a result of the sale of a defective product will be
enforced if such an intention of the parties is articulated with
46
particularity.
Keystone and Posttapewere both cited with approval by the Third
Circuit in Pennsylvania Glass Sand, and the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has not held to the contrary. Thus, while it is clear that
manufacturers of defective products face liability for physical damage to a defective product itself, it is equally clear that commercial
entities of relatively equal bargaining strength may limit their
exposure in contract or tort by utilizing properly drafted contractual
limitations of liability. 47 To be effective, however, these limitations must be drawn to reflect the intent or understanding of the
parties and must specifically address the type of remedy and form
of redress which they seek to limit or indeed eliminate. 48 Although Pennsylvania Glass Sand may be the subject of more unfavorable comment in the offices of some corporate risk managers
than Lobianco,149 if carefully drafted limitations of liability are
incorporated within the sales documents, exposure for physical
property damage including damage to a defective product itself in
a commercial setting may be sharply reduced or eliminated. 15
It can therefore be safely concluded that, unless manufacturers
of defective products sold to corporate customers of relatively equal
bargaining strength properly limit their liability in their sales contracts, they face exposure in tort for physical damage caused by the
sale of a defective product even if the damage to the product itself
is substantial. At the present time, however, under Pennsylvania
144. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
145. Id. at 149. See generally, Donnelly, After the Fall of the Citadel:
Exploitation of the Victory or Consideration of All Interests?, 19 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1 (1967); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966);
Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss, and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV.
309 (1973).
146. For a discussion of Posttape, see notes 93-95 and accompanying text

supra.

147. See note 91 supra.
148. Id.

149. For a discussion of Lobianco, see notes 132-41 and accompanying text
supra.

150. See note 91 supra.
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law, manufacturers will not be held liable in strict liability for a
buyer's loss of his bargain from the product's failure to meet his
expectations. Although this line of distinction is still not crystal
clear, it has indeed been more sharply defined by the Third Circuit
in Pennsylvania Glass Sand.
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